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The purpose of this thesis is to study the impact of the
Congressional Budget process on the Department of the Navy
(DoN) fiscal year 1990 budget. The thesis focuses on four
specific events that took place during the FY 1990 budget
process. These four events are: 1) the actions of the
Authorizing and Appropriating Committees, 2) a technical
estimating difference between the Congressional Budget
Office and the Department of Defense (DoD), 3) the Byrd
Amendment which took money from DoD and other appropriations
to fund the war on drugs and 4) the Cramm-Rudman-Holings
sequestration process. Each of these events had a seperate
and distinct effect on the FY 1990 DoN budget.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a case study of the effect of Congressional
actions on the FY 1990 Navy budget. The FY 1990 budget
followed an unusual path to its final destination. Along this
path, several events took place that had a significant impact
on the Navy's FY 1990 budget. This paper will explore four of
those events to determine exactly what impact they had on the
operating budgets for FY 1990 of the Department of Defense
(DoD), and the Navy.
The first event this thesis will explore is the actions of
the Authorizing and Appropriating Committees in both the House
and Senate. This is an event that takes place every year, but
it had some special twists during the development of the FY
1990 budget. The initial defense budget request was submitted
by President Reagan on January 9, 1989. This request asked
for $315.2 billion in budget authority (BA) and $303.0 billion
in outlays for budget function 050, National Defense. Of this
amount, $305.6 billion in BA and $293.8 billion in outlays
would go to the Department of Defense, as part of subfunction
051. The remainder of the BA and outlays within the 050
function were for Atomic Energy and Defensc related
expenditures, subfunctions 053 and 054 respectively. The Navy
request totaled $97.8 billion in BA for FY1990, or 32.1
percent of ti, total 050 BA. [Ref. 1]
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After President Bush took office he received some warning
that Congress was not likely to approve a budget for defense
that was in the range of President Reagan's final request. In
order to overcome this obstacle the President met with members
of Congress in a Bipartisan Budget Summit. This summit led to
an agreement and an amended budget request. The Bipartisan
Budget Agreement (BBA) allowed for a defense budget with
$305.5 billion in BA and $299.2 billion in outlays. [Ref. 2]
This bipartisan agreement made the actions of the
Authorizing and Appropriating Committees more difficult, but
interesting at the same time. With the total dollar figures
agreed upon by both the Democratic and Republican leadership,
debate would not center around the size of the budget, but
rather the mix of dollars and programs.
The second significant event that took place during the FY
1990 budget process was a technical estimating difference
between the Congressional Budget Office and DoD. This
difference centered on how to predict defense outlays from a
specified BA base. When the administration submitted the
revised budget for defense, their figures for BA and outlays
matched those agreed to in the summit (Ref.3]. These figures
for outlays were calculated using DoD outlay rates. However,
when CBO computed the outlays it used a different set of
equations. The result was an estimation that DoD outlays
would be approximately $3.8 billion higher than the summit
agreement allowed [Ref. 4].
4.
This difference in outlay estimation became the source for
significant controversy and ill will between the
administration and Congress. It took several months before
this problem could be resolved. The final resolution of the
estimating differences did not leave all the individuals
involved feeling good. The resolution of the issue involved,
among other things, a significant shift in the defense budget
request. BA was shifted from certain fast spending accounts
to slower spending ones. Some major DoN appropriations were
impacted. Some individuals felt that gimmickry and compromise
were used, and that the essence of the budget agreement was
violated. [Ref. 5]
The third major event that shaped the FY 1990 defense
budget was the Byrd Amendment. This amendment was added to
the Department of Transportation appropriations bill to
increase spending to fight the war on drugs. The amendment
called for an increase in spending of $3.2 billion from the
1989 level. Of this $3.2 billion, $1.3 billion in BA and
$0.8 billion in outlays would come from defense. [Ref. 6]
The final event this paper will explore is sequestration.
Congress was unable to pass a budget for FY 1990 that met the
Gramm-Rudman -Hollings (GRH) deficit reduction goals before the
beginning of the fiscal year. As a result, the sequestration
process in the GRH bill took effect in October. Until
Congress completed its reconciliation bill on November 22nd,
the defense budget was subject to significant reductions
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associated with sequestration. Even after reconciliation was
completed it was not sufficient to displace the sequester
entirely. The result was DoD and DoN lost important budget
resources even under this relatively small partial sequester.
When the initial sequester order was signed by President
Bush, he did not exempt the military pay accounts. This
decision raised much concern in the administration and in
Congress. The only other time a sequester had taken place, in
1986, President Reagan had exempted the personnel pay
accounts. Not protecting these accounts meant that the
military would have to reduce sharply the numbers of personnel
in the servize and/or slow promotion rates. Many felt that
the President was trying to pressure Congress, by not
exempting these accounts, and to force them to get an
acceptable budget. [Ref. 7]
The Congressional budget process for FY 1990 was colorful
and interesting because of the events described above and
explored in this paper. This paper is structured to reflect
the chronological order in which these events took place.
There is much overlap in these events, as the process of each
would happen concurrently with the other events.
There were other events that may have had an effect on the
Navy budget for FY 1990. These four developments stand out as
notable and discrete hurdles requiring negotiation. Because
the Navy has little control over its budget once it is
presented to Congress, this paper will focus on Congress and
4
DoD as the primary parties in the negotiation process. The
paper will trace specific dollar amounts to Navy accounts or
programs to determine the effect each of these events had on
the Navy.
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II. THE ACTIONS OF THE
AUTHORIZING AND APPROPRIATING COMMITTEES
The initial Defense budget submitted by outgoing President
Reagan allowed for two pe;:cent real growth in the defense
budget for FY 1990. This equated to $315.2 billion in budget
authority (BA) and $303.0 billion in outlays for budget
function 050 and $305.6 billion in BA and $293.8 billion in
outlays for budget function 051, which funds DoD. [Ref. 1]
On April 25th, Secretary of Defense Cheney unveiled a
revised defense budget proposal. The revised budget contained
cuts from the initial proposal to bring it in accordance with
the Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA) which President Bush had
negotiated with the ladership of Congress. The revised
figures for defense were $305.5 billion in budget authority
(BA) and $299.2 bi'.lion in outlays for budget function 050.
For budget function 051 the totals were $295.6 billion in
budget authority ana $289.8 billion in outlays. [Ref. 3]
A. REVISED PROPOSAL
The revised defense budget required cuts of approximately
$10 billion in BA and $4 billion in outlays. In order to meet
this requirement the administration made reduction choices
that reflected their priorities. These priorities were not in
agreement with the priorities of many individual legislators.
6
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A battle over the nature of the defense cuts would ensue in
both houses of Congress.
The President made cuts in the areas of weapons
production, research and development, and troop endstrengtii.
The new prc.(- 3al called for slowing production rates of
current weapons to develop replacement weapons. In the Army
this meant a phase out of the Apache and AHIP helicopters and
slowing production of the Blackhawk helicopter. This would
mean a savings of $346 million in BA for the three
helicopters. [Ref. 8]
In the budget revision presented to Congress, the Navy
took the largest hit of all the services with a reduction of
$3.9 billion in BA. The Navy outlay reductions were the
second highest at $.9 billion. The President's proposed
reductions for Navy weapons systems included dropping one LOS
ANGELES class submarine, ending production of the F-14D
fighter and slowing production of the F/A-18 aircraft. The
savings from this proposal would be $714 million, $365 million
and $156 million respectively. The Air Force would lose
production of the F-15 fighter, at a savings of $93 million.
[Ref. 81
The revised defense budget request also included slowing
production of new weapons systems that were having technical
or budget problems. This included slowing production of the
Air Force's B-2 bomber for a savings of $885 million. For the
Navy this meant slowing prod-ztion of the Seahawk helicopter
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and the T-45 training plane, saving $205 million and $264
million respectively. The Army would have to slow production
of the ATACMS long range artillery missile to save $46
million, and the ADATS anti-aircraft missile, saving $149
million. [Ref. 8]
The administration also canceled programs that had a
limited military mission. Included in this area were funds to
continue reasearch and development of an aerospace plane, $200
million savings, and disbanding of the WC-130 hurricane hunter
squadrons. Additionally, they proposed cancelling the Marine
Corps V-22 Osprey aircraft completely. This measure would
save $1.27 billion in FY 1990 and many billions more in follow
on years. This proposal was offset somewhat by purchasing
more replacement Sea Stallion helicopters. This would retain
adequate troop lift capabilities and only cost $300 million.
[Ref. 8]
Reduction of the size of the active Navy fleet was another
proposal in the revised budget request. The proposal would
limit the number of aircraft carriers to 14. This would occur
as a result of the retirement of the USS CORAL SEA when the
USS ABRAHAM LINCOLN is brought on line. This would save $53
million. Seven guided missile destroyers built in the 1950's
and 60's would also be retired, saving $74 million. Finally,
74 P-3 patrol aircraft would be retired for a savings of $68
million. [Ref. 8]
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The new defense proposal would cut $991 million from the
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program. This
proposal would also redirect the focus of SDI toward the
"Brilliant Pebbles" approach. [Ref. 8]
Table 1 summarizes the cuts proposed by President Bush by
military department and appropriation title. [Ref. 3]
TABLE 1















Defense Agencies -1.3 -0.7
Defense Wide -0.5 -0.3
Adjustment by Title
Military Personnel -0.7 -0.6





Military Construction -0.5 -0.1
Other 
-0.6 -0.4
B. CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE REACTIONS
Since the budget totals for discretionary spending had
been agreed to by all parties as part of the BBA, the primary
battle in the defense authorization bill was over specific
program choices. During the Reagan years, passage of defense
bills normally involved a brawl between the administration and
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Congress. The conflict was usually over arms control
provisions and/or the total spending figure considered
adequate for defense. Neither of these issues figured
prominently in the FY 1990 authorization debate. Rather, the
debate centered on the outlay implication of various defense
programs and the need to conform to the BA-outlay requirement
stipulated in the BBA. [Ref. 9]
As negotiation on the FY 1990 bill began, battle lines
were more narrowly drawn. One of the primary fights was in
the area of strategic weaponry. The debate over which new
ICBM system to develop and how much to fund for SDI research
were at the forefront. [Ref. 9]
In prior years the ICBM issue had been divided along party
lines, with Democrtas backing Midgetman and Republicans rail-
mobil MX. This year there was a danger of both missiles being
lost. Many Democrats, noting changes in Eastern Europe,
wanted to kill both programs. Republicans were making their
choices based on which program they supported, and would align
with Democrats to try and kill the one they opposed. SDI had
lost much of its White House and Congressional support with
the departure of President Reagan. [Ref. 9]
House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin favored
supporting the administration's program terminations as a
measure of good faith in making tough cutting choices. His
staff found only about $1 billion of fat in the request that
could be used to fund add-on programs. By June 17th Aspin
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stated he had already received requests for add-ons totalling
$6.8 billion. [Ref.9]
Without even considering the add-on programs, many
legislators were struggling to reinstate programs that had
been cut from Reagan's original proposal. This battle was
mostly one of constituent jobs rather than defense strategy.
The ending of production of F-14s had significant opposition
because of the closing of the Grumman plant on Long Island.
This one plant closure would have cost approximately 5600
jobs. The cancellation of the Marine Corps' V-22 Osprey was
opposed on similar grounds, and by the strong Marine
contingent on Capitol Hill. [Ref.9]
In order to find the funds for their own programs
congressmen took aim at other projects such as the B-2 bomber,
SDI and the Trident submarine. A feeling was in the air that
one could be for a strong defense and still cut enough money
from these big tickets to pay for pet projects.
By the 5th of August both the House and Senate had passed
authorization bills for defense. The bills differed
significantly in program and funding composition. The House
had provided funding for the research and procurement of the
V-22 aircraft. Additionally, they added funds to continue
procurement of the Navy F-14 fighter. The Senate bill had
allowed only for research and development of the V-22. The
Senate bill included four criteria to be met before DoD could
proceed to procurement of the V-22. These four tests were:
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(1) viability for commercial use, (2) commercial interest, (3)
export potential and (4) cost effective low-level production
rates [Ref. 1]. The Senate bill supported the
administration's request to cancel the F-14 program.
In order to pay for the additional funding of these two
programs, the House cut money from the strategic program
requests. The House bill cut the administration's request for
the B-2 program by $1 billion, to $3.7 billion. They cut the
rail garrison MX by $0.5 billion, to $0.6 billion, and cut the
entire request for Midgetman, which was close to $100 million.
The Senate authorized $4.4 billion for the B-2 and left both
the ICBM programs at the levels requested. SDI was an
additional area of discrepancy, with the House authorizing
$3.1 billion and the Senate $4.5 billion. [Ref. 10]
Though the Senate bill closely resembled the
administration's proposal it had several amendments opposed by
the administration. The B-2 program was a case in point.
Senator Cohen from Maine offered an amendment that stated the
Senate was only committed to the first few bombers, not the
entire fleet of 132. This amendment also instructed DoD to
consider cruise missiles as alternatives to the B-2 program.
An additional amendment on the B-2 required the Air Force to
secure a better warranty from the manufacturer. [Ref. 10]
While the Senate largely supported the request for SDI and
the ICBM programs, they did not pass without some opposition.
Amendments were brought, and defeated, that would have cut
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ICBM development and diverted funds from SDI to drug programs.
There were additional amendments of little substance that
passed with little opposition. These amendments ranged from
requiring specific reports on arms control to requiring the
purchase of only US produced beef. Such amendments had little
effect on actual dollar amounts. [Ref. 101
The appropriations committees followed much the same
pattern as the authorization committees had. The Senate
version of the bill more closely reflected the
administration's request than did that passed by the House.
However, on some of the more controversial areas of the bill,
SDI in particular, there appeared to be padding in the Senate
bill which would allow for an acceptable compromise with the
House. The House version of the appropriations bill was
passed on the 4th of August and the Senate version on
September 29th. [Ref. 11]
C. RESOLUTION AT CONFERENCE
Both the authorization and appropriations bills went to
conference and were passed in November. The most colorful
conference and the one that set the stage was the
authorization conference. The final result was not a bill
that made everyone happy, but one that was loaded with
compromises to attain enough votes for passage. The strategic
arena is where the bulk of controversy remained and where the
administration's request took the largest cuts.
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The conferees authorized $3.8 billion for SDI splitting
the approved levels in both houses down the middle. For the
new ICBM program they authorized funding for both the rail-
garrison MX and the Midgetman, but told DoD to find $150
million in reductions from the combined $1.2 billion request.
The Navy took a reduction of $300 million in its Trident II
missile program, lowering it to $1.3 billion. The B-2 program
was funded at $4.3 billion, but language was left in that
stated Congress was not committed to fullscale production.
[Ref. 12]
D. THE NAVY PORTION
The Navy budget did very well overall in both the
authorization and appropriations conferences. Both
conferences approved more than was requested for DoN programs.
The reason for this was that the Navy had relatively little
program involvement in the strategic programs cut by Congress.
Additionally, the revitalization of the F-14 and V-22 aircraft
programs bolstered the Navy budget despite the fact that no
funds had been requested. [Ref. 1]
The authorizations conference approved funding the F-14 to
$1.45 billion for production and modernization. The V-22 was
funded to $255 million for further development. The Sea
Stallion helicopter, which Secretary Cheney proposed as the
alternative to V-22, was funded at a reduced level of $254
million. [Ref. 12]
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Other areas of the Navy budget survived well also in the
authorization conference, receiving only minor reductions if
any at all. The $651 million requested for modernizing the
USS CONSTELLATION was approved. The conferees compromised on
$3.53 billion for construction of five Arleigh Burke class
destroyers. This was a reduction of $67 million from the
request. Money was added to increase the purchase of Standard
missiles by $44 million and the purchase of Phalanx guns by
$15 million. [Ref. 12]
The Seawolf class submarine was approved for production in
1991 and the last 62 of the Los Angeles class were approved at
$763 million, a cut of $43 million. The conferees cut the
request for Mark 48 torpedoes by $55 million to $439 million.
Mark 50 torpedoes received the entire $269 million requested.
[Ref. 12]
Minesweeping capabilities were enhanced by the approval of
$342 million for three new oceangoing ships. Three smaller
minesweepers were approved at $282 million, adding to the one
that was requested. Finally, amphibious forces received a
shot in the arm with the approval of one LSD-41 class landing
ship at $229 million. The request for air-cushioned landing
craft was increased from nine to 12, at $250 million.
[Ref. 12]
The authorization and appropriation phases of the FY 1990
budget process were more complicated than in previous years.
There were few extra dollars to fund non-requested legislative
15
initiatives. Because of the BBA and the limits it imposed,
legislators had less discretion to add programs, and were
forced to move money within the confines of the BA and outlay
totals provided in the summit agreement.
Table 2 sunarizes the defense BA totals approved by the
Authorizing and Appropriating Committees and the Navy's
portion of those totals. [Ref. 1)
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF COMMITTEE ACTIONS
ON FY 1990 DEFENSE BUDGETS
050 BA 051 BA DoN BA
HASC Bill 304.9 295.7 98.6
SASC Bill 305.7 296.3 98.1
Auth Conf 305.3 295.3 101.3
HAC Bill 304.6 295.3 101.5
SAC Bill 305.6 295.9 97.3
App Conf 303.7 294.0 101.2
Table 2 shows that the size of DoN appropriations do not
vary proportionally with either the 050 appropriations or the
051 appropriations. There is no direct correlation between
what the entire Defense Department receives and the size of
the Navy's share of that pie. The BA amounts for 050 vary
only $2 billion between any of the bills while the Navy
portion varies $4.2 billion between the HAC and SAC bills.
A major reason for the increase of the Navy portion in
both conference bills is BA-outlay mismatch issue. This issue
16
will be discussed in detail in chapter III. In essence, BA
was required to be shifted from fast outlay accounts to slower
spending accounts. The Navy benefited from this transfer in
appropriations as some of their slower spending accounts,
primarily the overhaul of the USS ENTERPRISE, were funded.
[Ref. 13)
Another anomaly that is apparent in this table is that the
appropriations conference bill is approximately $1.9 billion
below the BBA. The cause of this can be traced primarily to
funding of the war on c ugs. National defense had to give
away $1.18 billion to an emergency drug funding package, $300
million transferred to the Coast Guard and $125 million to
help the three Andean countries [Ref. 14]. This drug funding
issue will be discussed in detail in chapter IV.
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III. TECHNICAL ESTIMATING DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
AND THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE
In March of 1989 the President, his cabinet and advisors,
and the joint leaders of Congress agreed to convene a
negotiating group to try to establish a budget framework for
fiscal year 1990. The group was composed of the primary
decision makers in the budget process from both the
legislative branch and the administration. On April 14th the
group produced a Bipartisan Budget Agreement (BBA), that was
agreed to by the President, and the majority and minority
leaders of both houses of Congress. [Ref. 2]
This document stated budget authority and outlay levels
for three discretionary appropriations categories, including
national security. For defense, referred to as function 050
in legislative budget parlance, the agreed upon levels were
$305.5 billion in new Budget Authority and $299.2 billion in
outlays. A footnote to the BBA stated that "Congressional
enforcement of these discretionary levels in the legislative
process will be based on CBO scoring." [Ref. 2]
Since these levels had been agreed upon by all of the key
players in the budget process, it would seem that from this
point forward a relatively smooth path for the defense budget
was assured. But this was not to be the case. On April 25th
Secretary of Defense Cheney published a revised DoD budget
18
request. Within a few days there was disagreement between
CBO and the Department of Defense regarding the proper
technique to use to determine the appropriate relationship
between budget authority and outlays for defense accounts. A
CBO memo dated April 27th outlined the differences between DoD
and CBO in outlay estimates. [Ref. 15]
A. PAST PERFORMANCE
The exact amount of the difference in the outlay figure
associated with $305.5 billion in budget authority between
these two offices is difficult to pin down. Frequently cited
figures range from $3.4 billion to $3.8 billion, which amounts
to approximately one percent of the FY 1990 defense budget.
The result of the discrepancy was that both the administration
and congressional leaders retreated to their corners to
collect data in support of their positions on this critical
issue.
One of the first pieces of data revlevant to this
methodological conflict was produced by DoD and is displayed
in Table 3. Table 3 compares past records of DoD and CBO
predicting defense outlays. [Ref. 16]
From Table 3 it is unclear whether both forecasts were
taken at the same time. But it can be seen that in all but
three of the years of data collection CBO has estimated
outlays higher than DoD. The table also shows that DoD is
19
more likely to underestimate outlay.. while CBO is more likely
to overestimate oatlays. This suggests that a compromise of
both methods might be the most accurate formula to Ase for
predicting outlays. Both CBO and DoD used the same outlay
rates for predicting FY 1990 outlays as they had used to
TABLE 3
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (051) OUTLAYS
($ in billions)
Budget Year Forecasts vs Actual
Fiscal Year DOD CBO DOD-CBO
1981 -1.9 +0.8 -2.7
1982 (Carter) -5.6 -2.9 -2.7
1982 (Reagan) -1.2 +5.3 -S.5
1983 +3.4 +5.2 -1.9
1984 +12.5 +11.9 +0.6
1985 +12.8 +14.3 -1.5
1986 -2.8 -4.1 +1.3
1987 -13.4 +i.1 -14.5
1988 -3.6 -2.8 -0.8
1989* +2.5 +1.7 +0.8
* (first five months of data only)
predict FY 198) outlays [Ref. 16]. The table shows that both
estimates were in excess of actual outlays.
B. THE AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT
In a letter to Senate Budget ComriAttee Chairman Jim
Sasser, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney addressed the
differences between CBO and DoD outlay estimating procedures.
This letter attacked the CBO estimates as being overly
simplistic and de-fended the DoD estimates as more acc;at
given recent historicil data. rRef. 17]
Cheney's letter estimated the outlay problem at $3.8
billion, the same figure used in the CBO memo. This letter
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showed that the majority of the $3.8 billion could be
attributed to estimates of three major accountc. The first
account affected is the Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
account for all service7. CBO'3 failure to use recent data to
adjust estimates accounted for a difference of $2.1 billion.
The second series of accounts where disagreement was
significant was the stock funds, where an estimating
difference of $1.0 billion was found. The final set of
accounts with major DoD-CBO differences was Military
Personnel, where the estimating problems accounted for $0.3
billion of the total difference. [Ref. 17]
In the O&M accounts Cheney produced data that showed 95%
c)f the $2.1 billion in outlay differences could be attributed
to eight separate appropriations. He als) produced historical
outlay rate data to justify DoD estimating techniques. Table
4 summarizes this data. [Ref. 17]
These data show that DoD estimations for 1990 appear to
track the recent outlay experience in these accounts more
closely than those of CBO. In half of the accounts shown, the
CBO outlay xate for FY1990 exceeds the DoD projection by more
than ten percent. The remaining accounts ha.e less disparity
but the amounts generated by these differences are
significant. In each case the DoD estimate appears to more




Navy ($494M) Marine Corps ($229M) Air Force ($390M)
Percent Percent Percent
1986 71.1 1986 72.1 1986 74.7
1987 67.7 1987 70.1 1987 70.7
1988 73.5 1988 73.1 1988 76.3
DoD 90 73.4 DoD 90 71.6 DoD 90 76.3
CBO 90 76.0 CBO 90 85.0 CBO 90 78.0
Def AQ ($176M) Army Res ($137M) Navy Res ($11OM)
Percent Percent Percent
1986 87.2 1986 80.0 1986 62.6
1987 85.1 1987 73.7 1987 61.0
1988 85.1 1988 72.9 1988 66.7
DoD 90 83.8 DoD 90 72.1 DoD 90 65.8
CBO 90 86.0 CBO 90 88.1 CBO 90 77.0
Army Nat'l Gd ($249) A.F. Nat'l Gd ($209M)
Percent Percent
1986 80.6 1986 83.5
1987 77.6 1987 78.8
1988 75.9 1988 82.0
DoD 90 75.2 DoD 90 81.9
CBO 90 88.5 CBO 90 92.2
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The second area of contention in Cheney's memo was that of
Revolving and Management Funds. In this set of accounts the
Secretary of Defense claimed there was a difference of
$1.0 billion between CBO and DoD, accounted for by three
factors: 1) different outlay rates applied to appropriated
funds in the Stock Funds; (2) the effect of operating cash on
Stock Fund outlays, and (3) CBO's added judgement factor.
CBO uses an O&M rate to project outlays from these
appropriations, while DoD uses a purchase rate. Cheney
admitted that many of the items in the Stock Funds are
purchased by O&M appropriations, but that the process of
obtaining these items is more similar to that of the
procurement accounts, and therefore using a purchase rate is
more realistic and more closely predicts actual outlays.
Cheney states that CBO's first year outlay projection for FY
1990 in these accounts is $334 million above the DoD
estimate; this is largely offset by underestimating outlays
from prior year's authority. The final result, according to
Cheney, is that CBO has overestimated the FY 1990 outlays by
$.1 billion in this account. [Ref. 17]
Another area of disagreement involving stock fund outlays
is the proper approach to the difference between sales and
purchases by the Stock Funds and transfers from the Stock
Funds due to excess cash. Revolving and Management Funds are
meant to be self sustaining, and are to maintain enough cash
for 11 days of operation. When the (.ah level falis below the
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11 day minimum, prices are increased to customers to ensure
adequate cash flow. The appropriation of money to the Stock
Funds is to bring cash reserves to the 11 day minimum. Cheney
points out that CBO fails to adjust for the increased prices
and the additional cash generated. This inflow of cash acts
as a negative outlay. The difference is approximately a $.4
billion overestimation by CBO. [Ref. 17]
The final $.5 billion difference between DoD and CBO in
the estimation of outlays in the Stock Funds derives from a
"judgement factor" added by CBO. DoD objected to the use of
this adjustment because it felt it did not properly reflect
the operating status of the Stock Funds. One reason CBO may
have added that adjustment is because in two of the last three
years they grossly underestimated the outlays of the Stock
Funds. Table 5 shows the last three complete years and how
Stock Fund outlay estimates by each of the agencies fared. In
each of these years, DoD estimates were closer than those of
CBO. [Ref. 17]
TABLE 5
STOCK FUND OUTLAY ESTIMATES
DoD CBO
Year ($M) DoD CBO Actual Diff Diff
1986 2,124 817 2,877 -753 -2,060
1987 2,714 761 3,454 -740 -2,693
1988 1,359 1,876 1,021 338 855
The final set of accounts that Cheney singled out in his
memo are those for Military Personnel. The problem with this
set of accounts, according to DoD, is that CBO is applying the
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same outlay rate for all four services, when recent historical
data indicate that they outlay at different rates. Table six
shows the current CBO rate estimate and the actual outlay
rates of the past two years. [Refs. 3 and 17]
TABLE 6
MILITARY PERSONNEL OUTLAY RATES
CBO DoD Actual Actual
Service 1990 1990 1988 1987
Army 96.0 94.0 95.3 95.3
Navy 96.0 95.9 97.7 96.5
Marine Corps 96.0 95.3 96.5 95.7
Air Force 96.0 95.8 96.1 97.5
Cheney claims that the more detailed figures used by DoD
will save $.3 billion in outlay projections [Ref. 17]. More
than half of this would come from the first year outlay rate
used in the Army Military Personnel account. This account has
the largest amount of Budget Authority but the slowest
expenditure rate. The remainder of the savings would be in
the out year calculations of previously appropriated Budget
Authority.
While these were the only three areas where Cheney used
dollar figures to specify exactly where the differences in
outlays existed, he did identify some other procedural
differences that help to account for the remaining $.4
billion. One such difference is the use of Budget Authority
by CBO and Total Obligational Availability by DoD when
applying outlay rates. [Ref. 17]
Budget Authority includes appropriations, borrowing
authority, and contract authority, as permitted by law. Total
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Obligational Availability is budget authority plus (or minus)
any amounts transferred between accounts or funds. By using
budget authority to predict outlays from previous years'
appropriations, ronev that was transferred from one account
that spends slowly to an account that spends out quickly - or
vice versa -- is not accounted for. Cheney indicated that
approximately $2.6 billion would be transferred in FY 1989
from slow spending accounts to faster spending accounts,
thereby increasing outlays in 1989 and decreasing them in 1990
[Ref. 17].
The Cheney letter also noted that DoD divided certain
accounts into sections based on spending rates, allowing DoD
to more accurately predict outlays. CBO applies the same rate
for all four services and for an entire account regardless of
what the historical data show. One such account is Family
Housing. DoD separates this account into Construction and
Operation & Maintenance/Debt, while CBO combines them under
one rate. Historical data shows the construction portion
spending at 5% the first year, while the operations and
maintenance portion spends out at 60% the first year. [Ref.17)
C. THE "BEAN COUNTER" MINI-SUMMIT
In order to resolve the issues involved in scoring the
defense spending provision of the BBA, a "bean counter" mini
summit was arranged by DoD Comptroller Sean O'Keefe [Ref. 18].
In attendance were members of the DoD and CBO staffs,as well
as staffers from key members of the Congressional Committees
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with oversight authority for the defense budget, including the
Budget Committees, the Armed Services Committees and the
Defense Apropriation Subcommittees. An initial meeting was
held to determine what issues were causing differences in
estimation of outlays and should be discussed at the summit.
Table 7 lists the topics, issues and current approaches that
were to be discussed as of 16 August 1989. [Ref. 19]
The two sides agreed to discuss thirteen issues at this
summit. Within a month they had come to agreement on ten.
Nine of the agreements were from the original list reflected
in Table 7. One additional item was in the final agreement
that was not listed among the original issues. This
additional issue dealt the degree of accuracy for outlay
predictions. Table 8 lists the agreements reached at the end
of the mini-summit. [Ref. 20]
Most of the issues that Cheney had addressed in his letter
to the Budget Committee Chairman were addressed and worked out
at this summit. However, even after agreement on these issues
was reached, it was decided that these rules would take effect
for the FY 1991 budget process. They would not be used to






1. Budget Year & Should BA or TOA be used for outlay estimates
Outyears CBO: BA. DoD: TOA.
2. Current Year Should BA or TOA be used for outlay estimates?
CBO: BA. DoD: TOA.
3. Prior Years Should BA or TOA be used for outlay estimates?
CBO: BA or unexpended balances.
DoD: TOA.
4. Lapses Should outlay rates be calculated using TOA adjusted
for lapses?
CBO: Make no adjustments for BA lapses.
DoD: Adjust TOA for lapses before making estimates.
5. Reimbursable Should there be outlay rates for
program for reimbursable programs?
outlays CBO: Not directly.
DoD: Yes.
Appropriation Scorekeeping
1. Prior Year Should prior year transfers be scored
Transfers using first year rates?
CBO: Use first year outlay rate.
DoD: Use rate from year appropriated.
2. Budget year Should the outlay rate be for the
transfers gaining or losing account?
CBO: Use rate for losing account.
DoD: Use rate for gaining account.
Outlay Rates/Calculations
1. 100% Should outlay rates assume lapses?
expenditure CBO: No.
rate DoD: Yes.
2. Reflect When annual M-account outlays exceed
M-accounts $3 billion, should estimates reflect such spending?
CBO: Yes, using an extra year outlay rate.
DoD: Yes, using judgement adjustments based on
unexpended balances.
3. Macro Title Should a single outlay rate be used for
outlay rates a block or title of accounts?




4. Outlay Rates Should outlay rates adjust for
for sub-accounts?
sub-accounts CBO: No.
DoD: Yes, for Milpers, SCN and some "black
programs.
5. Revolving Funds Should the DoD approach be adopted?
CBO: Use O&M rate for BA, and judgement for
operations.
DoD: Use purchase rate for BA, and cash position
for operations.
Other Issues
1. Timing of Should both DoD and CBO make estimates
Estimates estimates in November?
CBO: Late January with 3 months of current year
data.






1. 100% expenditure rate CBO changed its approach and
will reflect lapses in its
outlay forecasts.
2. M-account DoD changed and included an
additional year in the outlay
rates. This represents M account
spending, replacing the judgement
adjustments.
3. Macro title outlay CBO will assign individual outlay rates
to all appropriations based on past
performance.
4. Revolving Funds BA will expend at purchase rates.
Outlay adjustments due to the cash
position in the stock and industrial
funds will be discussed further.
5. Outlay rates for Each Milpers and Family
sub accounts Housing appropriation has its own set of
outlay rates. The two Air Force
appropriations containing large amounts
of compartmental programs will have two
sets of outlay rates. CBO agreed with
DoD outlay estimates for SCN.
BA/TOA Scorekeeping
1. Current Year, Budget In most cases, Budget
year, and outyears Authority is used. TOA is used on an




2. Prior Years CBO will continue to use unexpended
balances and DoD will use TOA for the
prior years. DoD has established a
forecasting model using unexpended
balances similiar to CBO that was used
when setting outlay rates. The outlay
estimate for CBO and DoD was compared
and all major differences were
addressed.
3. Reimbursable Reimbursable program will not
program be used. If major shifts occur in the
size of the program, the outlay rate
will be adjusted.
Other Issues
1. Timing of estimate DoD will furnish CBO budget data on a
timely basis. This will allow CBO and
DoD time to discuss any differences in
outlay projections and arrive at an
agreed upon outlay forecast, except for
APAF.
2. Degree of accuracy Outlay rates will be expressed in a
tenth of a percent.
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D. SHIFTING MILITARY PAY
Even though the differences that were the cause of the FY
1990 outlay estimation crisis were addressed and apparently
resolved for the outyears by the mini-summit, the question of
how to resolve the FY 1990 problem remained unanswered. In
July of 1989, Secretary Cheney proposed, in a letter to
Congressman John Murtha, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Defense, Committee on Appropriations, to shift the October 1st
paydate for military personnel to September 30th. The result
of this action would be to move the outlays associated with
this paydate from FY 1990 to FY 1989, erasing three quarters
of the $3.8 billion outlay issue. [Ref. 22]
The reaction in Congress to this proposal was sharply
negative. Many in Congress felt that this was an accounting
gimmick that did not produce real savings or real gains in
deficit reduction. Others in Congress, sympathetic to DoD's
outlay problem, were concerned that if DoD were allowed to
achieve savings in this manner, other governmental agencies
would follow suit. The result would be further erosion of the
deficit reduction effort. However, it was, at the time,
completely within the power of Secretary Cheney to order the
payday shift and he did just that. [Ref. 22]
In response to Secretary Cheney's action on the paydate
shift, the Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee
offered an amendment to the defense authorization bill
prohibiting the Secretary of Defense from shifting paydays.
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This amendment passed 326 to 97. The Senate Armed Services
Committee approached the issue by ordering DoD to control
outlays so they did not exceed the budgeted ceiling. That is,
language was added to the Senate-passed version of the FY 1990
defense authorization bill directing the Department of Defense
to insure that it did not exceed the $299.2 billion outlay cap
stipulated in the BBA. But because Congress did not approve
a final defense authorization bill until November, neither of
these proposals was effective. The paydate was shifted and
the outlays occurred in FY 1989 before the authorization bill
became law. (Ref. 23]
E. SHIFTING THE DEFENSE PROGRAM MIX
As the paydate controversy was unfolding, The Senate
Democratic leadership proposed a major compromise to the
outlay impasse. This proposal was made in a letter signed by
Senator Byrd, Chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee,
Senator Sasser, Chariman of the Senate Budget Committee, and
Senator Inouye, Chairman of the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, and had the backing of Senate Majority Leader
Mitchell. The proposal would require DoD to come up with
shifts in the defense program mix to save $1.9 billion in
outlays -half of the problem amount. Although the letter,
dated August 4th, was very vague in its wording, its
implication was that the remaining $1.9 billion of outlay
discrepancies would be ignored. [Ref. 5]
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In response to the Democratic proposal, Secretary Cheney
made a list of recommended progiam shifts, and submitted it to
the authorization bill conferees on the 29th of September.
These recommended changes to defense accounts would keep all
of the BA agreed to in the BBA but satisfy the CBO in meeting
the outlay calculations. (Ref. 13]
Acceptance of the scoring change affecting the USS
ENTERPRISE overhaul/refueling and the aircraft modification
kits was a major change in the program mix. These two
programs played a major role in solving the outlay conflict.
They were allowed to be scored as procurement activities,
wriich have slow spendout rates, rather than O&M activities,
which spend out much faster. This change allowed DoD to
retain all of the BA allowed by the BBA, while moving outlays
to later years and meeting the BBA outlay target for FY 1990.
Table 9 summarizes the changes proposed by Secretary Cheney.
[Ref. 13]
The recommendations submitted by Secretary Cheney were
adhered to quite closely in the final defense authorization
bill. The final appropriations bill took Cheney's
recommendations even further, cutting an additional $.4
billion from O&M, $.6 billion from RDT&E and $.5 billion from
procurement.
F. HOW THE NAVY WAS AFFECTED
The Navy did not experience a significant adverse impact
as a consequence of the outlay dispute. In the final totals
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authorized and appropriated by both bodies of Congress, the
Navy was funded to at least 100 percent of its request in all
but one major account [Ref. 1]. The only account that was
TABLE 9
CHENEY PROPOSAL
CHANGES IN BA REQUESTED
($ IN BILLIONS)
FY 1990 Change to
Request Request Total
Milpers $79.2 -0.4 78.8
O&M 90.2 -3.8 86.4
Procurement 700.8 +5.7 84.4
Mod. Kits (+3.4)
ENTERPRISE (+1.3)
R&D 39.6 -1.7 37.9
Milcon & FH 8.1 -0.2 7.8
DOE 9.4 +0.3 9.7
Drugs --- +0.6 0.6
Other 0.2 ---- 0.2
funded below the requested amount was the O&M/Stock Fund
account, which was funded at only about 92 percent.
As a result of the shift in the defense program from fast
to slow spending accounts the Navy received a large increase
in BA for its procurement a, count. This account was funded at
117.9 percent and 118.9 percent of its request by the
authorization and appropriations conferences, respectively.
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IV. THE BYRD AMENDMENT
On September 27th the Senate passed an amendment to the
Transportation Appropriations bill that would increase
spending on anti-drug programs by $3.2 billion. The amendment
was proposed by Senator Robert C. Byrd, D-W.Va., Chairman of
the Senate Appropriations Committee, and thus bears his name.
The manner in which this increase was to be funded affected
spending for all other appropriation accounts, including those
for defense. [Ref. 6]
Enactment of the amendment would bring an increase of
nearly sixty percent of the total funds for anti-drug
programs. The purpose of the bill was to increase monies both
for enforcement and education/rehabilitation. [Ref. 6]
The amendment was introduced in response to a speech by
President Bush on September 5th calling for additional
spending on drug programs. Bush initially wanted about a
forty percent increase in anti-drug spending, but leuislators
were anxious to put their mark on this very political issue.
The proposal by the president was for approximately $2.1
billion, most of which was to go to enforcement rather than
education. The additional $1.1 billion contained in the Byrd
amendment would go primarily to educational and rehabilitation
programs. [Ref. 24]
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The debate over where the money would be spent took nearly
two weeks. Most Congressmen wanted to be associated in some
way with anti-drug legislation and have a mark on it.
In order to pay for this increase in drug programs, a .43
percent reduction in all appropriations bills would be
necessary. The original proposal by Senator Byrd called for
.3 percent of the cuts to be taken across the board, that is,
from all discretionary appropriations accounts. The remaining
.13 percent would be at the discretion of the Senate and House
conferees on the final appropriations bills. [Ref. 61
The defense budget was exempted from this allocation plan.
By virtue of its size, defense appropriations would absorb the
greatest dollar figure of the cuts. Because of this, all of
the money from defense would be discretionary. Rather than
cutting all defense accounts across the board by 0.3 percent,
the entire amount of the defense contribution to the anti-drug
spending initiative would be determined by the chairmen and
senior Republicans of the Armed Services and Defense
Appropriations committees. [Ref. 6]
The House objected to this formula for allocating cuts.
Many House members felt that the total amounts, not just 0.13
percent, should be discretionary. Each subcommittee would be
given a dollar figure that was required to be cut and they
would decide where to cut [Ref. 6]. In other words, all
accounts should be given the discretion that defense would be
37
given in the Senate proposal. This approach was finally
adopted by the Congress.
The dollar figure given for defense to cut was $1.3i8
billion in BA and $800 million in outlays [Ref. 25]. Because
the cuts were not to be enforced across the loard, the exact
impact on DoD and the Navy is very difficult to assess.
The amendment required that the Senate and House agree on
a new set of 302(b) allocation numbers in accordance with the
1974 Budget Act, to reflect this increase and stay within the
BBA and deficit reduction caps [Ref. 26]. However, the final
Defense Authorization bill does not reflect this number,
authorizing $295.3 billion of the $295.6 billion in BA agreed
to in the BBA and reflected in the revised budget request for
function 051. [Ref. 1]
At $294.0 billion, the final Defense Appropriations bill
is $1.6 billion lower than the request. Of this, $1.18
billion was to go to the emergency drug funding package
proposed in the Byrd amendment. An additional $300 million
was taken from DoD and given to the Coast Guard for their
anti-drug operations. These two reductions total more than
was expected from the Byrd amendment. [Ref. 14]
When the DoD Comptroller, Mr. Sean O'Keefe, explained the
effects of sequester on the DoD budget in November (discussed
in chapter V), he noted that his figures did not reflect the
Byrd amendment. They probably did not reflect it because no
determination had been made on where the cuts were to come
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from at that time. This briefing took place before the final
appropriations bill had been passed so he would have not known
what the legislators had planned to do. [Ref. 7]
As was mentioned in chapter two of this paper, the Navy
appropriations were funded in excess of 100 percent for all
accounts except operations and maintenance. Therefore, little
if any effect was felt in the Navy by this amendment to
provide increased anti-drug funds.
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V. SEQUESTRATION
In December 1985 Congress enacted the Balanced Budget and
Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177). This
legislation, better known as the Gramm-Rudman Hollings Act,
was to ensure a balanced federal budget by 1991. In 1987 the
GRH Act was amended by the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act (P.L. 100-119). This
amendment stretched out the deficit reduction goals and
ensured a balanced budget by 1993. Table 10 summarizes the













Included in the GRH bill is a procedure for implementing
automatic budget cuts known as sequestration. Sequestration
takes effect if Congress fails to enact appropriations bills
and taxing laws that achieve the GRH target deficit goals by
October 1st. During the FY 1990 budget process, Congress
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failed to pass the necessary appropriation bills in time, and
was also late in completing reconciliation legislation.
The sequestration process is supposed to follow a strict
timeline. If Congress fails to cut the budget and or increase
taxes sufficiently each year, dramatic and automatic spending
cuts are supposed to take effect. Each event is set to ensure
that the process is carried out as written. The schedule also
allows time for small adjustments in the defense portion of





Initial Snapshot by CBO/OMB 15 August
Last day for President to
exempt Milpers accounts 15 August
President issues initial
sequester order 20 August
Fiscal year begins/order
becomes effective 1 October
OMB issues revised report
to Congress and President 15 October
President issues final order 15 October
Last day to offer modification
of defense programs 20 October
Last day for joint resolution
to modify final order 10 days after revised
OMB report
Compliance order issued 15 November
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The sequestration process for FY 1990 started on August
15th as required by the GRH law. At that time OMB and CBO
each took a snapshot of the current spending laws in effect
and the economic outlook to determine the deficit projected
for FY 1990. Based on the available data if the projected
deficit for FY 1990 were to exceed $110 billion, across the
board cuts would be required to reduce the deficit to the
required $100 billion level. The GRH deficit target for 1990
was $100 billion, but a $10 billion buffer or "float" is
allowed before automatic cuts take place. That means that if
Congress, by its spending and taxing legislation, comes within
$10 billion of the target, the sequester is unnecessary.
However, if Congress fails to come within $10 billion of the
deficit target and a sequester takes effect, the deficit
target must be met exactly, i.e. there is no float. [Ref. 29]
Since no appropriation bills had been enacted for FY 1990
at the time of this initial estimate, the deficit was
calculated using FY 1989 outlays plus inflation. This is of
course offset by current tax laws and economic assumptions
that determine revenue totals. Using this formula the deficit
was calculated on August 15th at $116.2 billion for FY 1990.
[Ref. 30]
This calculation meant that the federal government would
have to cut $16.2 billion from the budget. GRH requires that
these automatic cuts come from defense and non-defense
discretionary accounts equally, with a few marginal
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exceptions. Those exceptions are the programs that are either
fully or partially exempted from these automatic cuts.
Fully exempted programs include, but are not limited to,
social security benefits, interest on the national debt,
veteran's compensation, food stamps, and defense funds
obligated in previous years. The list of fully exempted
programs accounts for approximately half of total federal
outlays. The list of partially exempted programs accounts for
between 25 and 30 percent cf total federal outlays. That list
includes medicare and other health programs which are limited
to a two percent cut. Therefore about one quarter of the
federal programs must absorb the brunt of the automatic cuts.
[Ref. 27]
On August 25th OMB issued the initial sequester order
requiring the $16.2 billion to be withdrawn on a prorated
basis. The sequester is enacted on a prorated basis because
it is assumed that Congress will pass appropriation bills that
will rearrange the cuts if not reinstate the money. This way
there is a time element to the sequester, and every day under
a sequester dollars are lost in authority unless Congress
overides the sequester with its appropriation bill. [Ref. 271
The GRH Act requires that all "programs, projects, and
activities" subject to sequestration be cut equally. However,
in order to offset the catastrophic effects of across the
board cuts on defense, the president has the authority under
GRH to propose a different mix of cuts. [Ref. 27]
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If the president chooses to exercise this authority he may
choose from two alternatives. First, he may totally or
partially exempt the military personnel accounts. This is
done in order that manning levels do not have to absorb
drastic cuts. If this option is chosen, the outlay savings
lost from military personnel must be absorbed equally by the
remaining defense accounts so that the total sequester amount
charged to defense remains the same. [Ref. 27]
The second alternative is for the President to propose a
different mix of funding cuts in some programs to offset the
cuts in other accounts. If this option is excercised,
protection of spending in certain accounts must be offset by
more severe cuts in other accouts. The President's proposal
may not allow any account's outlays to exceed what was
appropriated. This is so the president cannot pick and choose
his own program mix without congressional approval, i.e. the
president cannot fund SDI at a higher level than previously
appropriated. It is also prohibited for the proposal to close
a domestic base or cancel any program. [Ref. 27]
Under previously existing law the president has some
flexibility to adjust spending requirements within the
Department of Defense. The law allows the President $3
billion that he may move between accounts in order to better
manage outlays.
On October 19th the President submitted an alternative
sequester report for the Department of Defense. Instead of
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asking for a specific change in the mix of sequestration cuts,
the President asked that the amount of funds available for
transfer be increased from $3 billion to $6 billion. The
President did not exempt the military personnel accounts from
sequestration. [Ref. 7]
On November 8th the Senate Armed Services Committee held
a hearing to determine the impact of a sequester on the
Department of Defense. Testifying on behalf of DoD were the
Deputy Chiefs of Staff from each of the services, as well as
Sean O'Keefe, DoD Comptroller.
Mr. O'Keefe was the primary speaker at the hearing, and
presented a DoD point paper that outlined the potential impact
of sequestration on National Defense. The Comptroller's pz-per
calculated that $13.3 billion in new BA and $1.7 billion in BA
associated with unobligated balances would have to be cut in
order to meet the outlay requirements. These figures are
assuming that military personnel accounts would be subject to
sequestration. If military personnel accounts were exempted,
$16.5 billion in new BA and $2.8 billion in BA associated with
unobligated balances would be required to be cut. Table 12
summarizes these cuts. [Ref. 7]
The budget cuts presented in this paper are taken from the
GRH baseline amounts for National Defense, and assume a full
year sequester. However, Mr. O'Keefe presented data that
anticipated two other possible scenarios involving the effects
of the sequester on DoD. Both of these scenarios assume that
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the Milpers accounts are not exempted. The starting point or




(in billions of 1990 $)
Milpers Milpers
not exempt exempt
Account New BA U B New BA UOB
Military Personel 3.4 ---
O&M 3.8 --- 6.4 ---
Procurement 3.6 1.4 6.0 2.3
RDT&E 1.7 .1 2.8 .2
MilCon .3 .1 .4 .2
Family Housing .1 .2 ---
Total 051 12.9 1.6 15.9 2.7
DOE .4 .1 .6 .1
Total 050 13.3 1.7 16.5 2.8
important because the higher the baseline figure, the higher
the final appropriation, all things being equal. But all
things are not equal. There is a provision in GRH II that may
offset part of the sequester once a full year appropriation is
passed. If the appropriated amount is below the GRH baseline
that appropriation has the sequester amount reduced. The
amount by which the sequester is reduced is determined by
comparing the baseline amount to the final appropriation
amount. The sequester is reduced by the difference between
these two amounts. This provision is known as the Muris rule
and it would apply to the defense accounts.
The first scenario was if the Senate Appropriations bill
became the final appropriation bill for defense. If this were
to happen, then BA cuts of $7.4 billion would be required.
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The defense budget authority cut in this scenario is not as
great as the reduction if it were from the GRH baseline. This
is because special rules of the GRH act require that once
fullyear appropriations are enacted, savings below the GRH
baseline must be taken into account. [Ref. 7]
The second scenario of cuts assumes that the government
will be funded under a continuing resolution for the entire
year. The government was functioning under a continuing
resolution at the time of this hearing. Funding levels for
all accounts in the continuing resolution were determined by
taking the lower of the House or Senate Appropriation bill for
each account. This is important because the baseline from
which sequester amounts are subtracted is much lower under
this formula. After figuring the continuing resolution total
the sequester amount required would be $6.1 billion in BA.
Table 13 summarizes the sequester impacts on DoD BA and
outlays under each of the possible scenarios. [Ref. 7]
Mr. O'Keefe explained that at the current time DoD was
making sequester cuts on the basis of the continuing
resolution. They were doing this because law required them to
use the funding law that was currently in effect. The
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The committee was primarily interested in the effect the
sequester would have on military personnel. Mr. O'Keefe and
the assistant chiefs all explained that the effect on military
personnel was going to be significant regardless of which
scenario finally played out. Under both the Senate
appropriations bill and the continuing resolution, $3.3
billion in BA would have to be cut from the military personnel
accounts. This number equates to havinc to reduce the active
duty members of the military by 170,000 to 200,000 personnel.
[Ref. 7]
The committee questioned all of the assistant chiefs and
Mr. O'Keefe on why the administration would not exempt
military personnel from the sequester if the results were this
disastrous. The response in each case was that although the
military could not afford the personnel cut, DoD could also
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not afford the alternative. The alternative would be to
exempt the Milpers accounts and take a higher cut in all other
DoD accounts. [Ref.7]
The hearing concluded with most of the Senators voicing
their opinions on why they would not s',.port the
administration's request to increase the transfer authority.
They also expressed astonishment on how the DoD could be so
calm about a sequester when they were fighting tooth and nail
against significantly smaller cuts just a few months before.
(Ref. 7]
Cn November 22nd a budget reconciliation bill was passed
and much of the uncertainty associated with the sequester was
ended. However, the sequester was not completely done away
witl in this bill, as is possible. A partial modified
sequester was left in place that would have required a 1.5
percent decrease in the defense budget. [Ref. 31]
The special PRH rules thet govern the implementation of
sequester further reduced the impact of the defense sequester.
One such rule, called the "Muris" rule, requires that those
activities that have already made budget cuts below the GRH
baseline be given credit for those cuts once a sequester takes
effect and a final fullyear appropriation bill is passed. The
calculation of the size of the sequester for the national
defense function would have been $4.6 billion in BA and $2.87
billion in outlays without the special rules. [Ref. 31]
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After invoking the Muris rule the calculations for
national defense indicated $2.7 billion reduction in BA and
$2.05 billion in outlays, saving $1.9 billion in BA and $.82
billion in outlays. This amounted to less than a one percent
cut in spending. This doesn't mean that DoD was not impacted
at all by this cut. The fact that BA was reduced
significantly more than outlays under these rules meant that
the fast spending accounts would take most of the sequester.
[Ref. 31]
Military personnel and operations and maintenance accounts
took the majority of the cuts from the sequester. The actual
impact of this action was unknown at the time, but in January
1990 Secretary Cheney proposed a reprogramming action to the
military personnel accounts in order to make up the
difference. It was not until well into FY 1990 that this
action was complete, and it proved to be a significant cause
of friction between DoD and Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman of
the House Armed Services Committee.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
The budget process has grown in complexity, as both the
size and the anxiety regarding the deficit have grown.
Dramatically increasing porticns of each year's budget are
going to nondiscretionary expenditures. This causes people to
fight aggressively for a piece of the shrinking discretionary
pie.
Whether the size of the deficit and the budget have an
effect on the economy or not is not important for the purpose
of this paper. The perception that the budget is out of
control and that deficits must be reduced is in place. It is
a political issue that elected politicians must deal with.
They use the deficit to get elected and promise to reduce it.
Others promise to use what remains of discretionary spending
in the budget to help their constituents.
Increased emphasis on the size of the government budget
and more specifically the deficit, has had some positive
effects. Presumably, we having been cutting some of the fat
out of the budget for the last several years. Whether the
government is better managing programs and funds is a matter
of opinion. Certainly when we ask managers to do the same
mission with fewer funds, some of the fat must have been cut
out.
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Increased Congressional intervention in the management of
the government has also been a consequence of the increased
attention on the budget. The easiest way legislators see to
control government actions is through the budget process.
Constituents accept and expect their elected officials to
watch their tax dollars like a hawk.
Whether this increased congressional prescence in the
budget is good or bad is not important. The fact is that this
condition exists, and budget officials in the administration
and Congress must deal with it. DoD and the Navy are no
exceptions, as persons working in the budget shops of these
organizations must expect to deal with Congress. This paper
has attempted to outline where congressional intervention may
occur and what types of events DoD and DoN budget officers may
need to address.
The FY 1990 Congressional budget process was a complicated
and unique endeavor. The FY 1990 process is different because
of the way the events unfolded, but it was exactly like
previous years in that politics and confrontation still played
a major role.
The Bipartisan Budget Agreement reached between the
administration and congressional leaders was supposed to allow
the process to flow more easily. This paper points out that
that was not the case. While the BBA established the limits
of spending in each major budget function, it did not
alleviate political fights over program mixes, and it failed
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to anticipate the consequences for the defense budget of the
BA-outlay controversy, the Byrd amendment and the partial
sequester.
The BBA also caused, or at least exacerbated, the conflict
over outlay estimation. It brought to a head a conflict that
had, for the most part, been ignored in past years. If
anything positive has come out of the FY 1990 exercise it
would have to be the mini-summit that helped minimize the
outlay estimating problem for future years.
As one of the largest functions of discretionary spending,
the national defense (050) and DoD (051) accounts were at the
center of all the controversy. The fight over program mixes
and the need to save constituent's jobs was unusual this year
because of the focus on deficit reduction. This focus, which
brought about the BBA, complicated the actions of the
congressional oversight committees.
In order to fund favorite programs individual legislators
were forced to find offsets from other programs that would
allow the BA and outlay figures to remain the same. This
meant, in theory, that if a congressman wanted a program
inserted into the defense budget it would require him to find
and propose cancellation of a program or set of programs with
the exact same BA and outlay mix.
Two of the most political programs in the FY 1990 budget
process were Navy/Marine Corps programs -the V-22 and the F-
14D. Both of these programs were cut completely in the DoD
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revised budget request. Political interests and the power of
legislators wishing to preserve these programs won out and
both were funded to a limited degree. This increased the Navy
portion of the budget for FY 1990. Whether the program mix
that was forced on DoD will effect them in future years is yet
to be determined.
The technical estimating difference of outlays is a
significant problem that budget officials must continue to
monitor. The mini-summit has decreased the likelihood of a
reoccurrence but has not done away with it. Secretary
Cheney's presentation of detailed information and statistical
records helped gain credibility for the department. Future
budget officials should be well versed in the history of this
event and be prepared to react again.
The BA-outlay problem engulfed the budget process for many
months and may have been a primary reason for the length of
the process. The political side of -he process slows it down
enough without injecting these techi.ical problems to slow it
even further.
The Byrd amendment may not be repeated again in future
years but other amendments like it may very well be come up.
While this year's event was fairly insignificant because of
its size, future events may not be so small. In 1989
congressional smoke and mirrors helped the Department avoid a
sizable cut. Such amendments in the future, coupled with the
increased emphasis on eliminating smoke and mirrors, will have
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to be dealt with. The Department of Defense must be prepared
for such events and remain flexible.
The FY 1990 defense sequester was alleviated by the fact
that the Department had already absorbed numerous cuts in the
regular appropriations process. If the Department expects
shrinking budgets in the future, this will offer limited
protection from the threat of a sequester. But, as soon as
the budget total levels off, even in nominal dollars, this
could be a significant event to deal with. Once again
flexibility on the part of budget officials is the best way to
deal with this issue.
The FY 1990 budget process was as unique as every year's
process is. There were some events that budget officials can
learn from and be prepared to encounter in the future. This
presentation of the process should be an aid to those required
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